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Introduction
This paper presents a ‘concept-theoretic’ position on the 
relationship between law and morality in any legal system that includes 
respect for human rights as a fundamental principle of the legal validity 
of its rules. With European Union law (EU law) as its central focus, 
this concept-theoretic position is premised upon the adoption by the 
EU and its member states of fundamental principles, which include 
human rights under the concept of a human right contained within the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) and the human 
rights conventions and other instruments that give effect to the latter, 
and elicits what follows logically and conceptually from this adoption. 
The concept-theoretic position is, thus, tied to the positive law of the 
EU and its member states in so far as it reasons from the status given 
to human rights by the legislative bodies and courts of and within the 
EU. However, it is not tied completely to this positive law. It retains 
an independent critical edge in that it does not take the jurisprudence 
of the relevant courts to be definitive as to the principles that follow 
logically from the adoption of human rights principles by the EU. Its 
guiding assumption is that, given the current status of human rights 
within the EU, the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU), and, indeed, any EU law−hence any EU Intellectual 
Property law (IP law)−must (in order to be valid) be consistent with 
what follows logically and conceptually from the concept of a human 
right given by the UDHR.
This Paper has Three Parts
In Part One, we present the concept-theoretic framework, 
primarily, but not exclusively, with reference to EU Patent law as an 
exemplar. Operating with the idea that moral requirements are, by 
definition, requirements on action governed by a categorically binding 
impartial principle [1], we argue first that human rights, as conceived in 
international human rights instruments that are intended to implement 
the UDHR, are moral rights. Such rights have, for some time, been 
recognized by the CJEU as fundamental principles of EU Law [2], and 
this status has recently been formalized by the incorporation of the EU’s 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms into the Constitution of 
the EU [3]. Secondly, we argue that this entails that any instrument of 
EU law that does not protect human rights in relation to its remit, or 
which is contrary to human dignity (which the preamble to the UDHR 
proclaims to be the foundation of fundamental rights and freedoms) is 
void (which is just the position that the CJEU has consistently adopted) 
[4]. In short, no EU law may validly prescribe or permit activities that 
it regulates that violate human rights or human dignity. Since human 
rights are moral rights, it follows that EU law may not grant any IP 
right if to do so would be contrary to human rights or human dignity. 
So, for example, under Directive 1998/44/EC on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions, inventions must be considered patentable 
on the ground of immorality if to grant a patent would be contrary 
to human rights or human dignity, even though this is not expressly 
stated in the Directive [5]. While human rights requirements are clearly 
moral requirements (as we have defined them), moral requirements are 
not necessarily human rights requirements−which raises the question, 
‘What moral requirements other than those connected to human 
dignity and human rights must patentable inventions meet?’ The 
answer provided by Directive 1998/44/EC is any such requirements 
listed in Article 6(2) as well as ‘ethical or moral principles recognized 
in a Member State’ (recital 39). Putting this together, we argue thirdly 
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that (i) there are some requirements that are readable into (indeed, 
would need to be read into EU patent law, even if Article 6 had never 
been enacted) [6]; (ii) some moral conditions of patentability are 
not open to the discretion of member states, whereas other are; (iii) 
given that Article 6(1) of the Directive specifies that patents may not 
be granted for inventions the commercial exploitation of which is 
contrary to ordre public or morality, the conditions under which 
the commercial exploitation of the invention is contrary to morality 
cannot be the only immorality conditions under which a patent may 
not be granted, or else these conditions must, for the purposes of the 
Directive, be identical to those under which the grant of a patent is 
contrary to morality; (iv) there is a definite sense in which exclusions 
under Article 6 must be interpreted broadly, not narrowly−contrary 
to the manner in which general exclusions under patent law are 
customarily interpreted. Fourthly, we argue that extra flesh can be put 
on the content of the morality that must be consistent with human 
rights and human dignity, on the basis of a principle that any system 
of rules must recognize on pain of having no coherent application to 
actions, viz., the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives (also known as 
the Principle of Instrumental Reason) (PHI), If doing X or having Y is 
necessary for an agent (A) to do E, then A must do X or act to secure 
possession of Y, or give up pursuit of E. When the PHI is coupled 
with the idea that there are conditions (‘generic conditions of agency’) 
(GCAs) that are necessary for all action or successful action, regardless 
of the purposes involved (i.e., regardless of what E is or might be) [7], 
it follows that no system of rules can have any coherent application to 
agents [8] unless it is consistent with the principle A ought to act to 
defend A’s possession of the GCAs unless A is willing to suffer generic 
damage to A’s ability to act. From this, we argue that it follows that any 
requirements for morality recognized by EU law must be consistent 
with (though not necessarily exhausted by) the principle, A ought to 
act to defend any other agent’s (B’s) possession of the GCAs unless B is 
willing to suffer generic damage to B’s ability to act. Putting these two 
principles together entails that all EU law must recognize that all agents 
have rights to the GCAs, which is to say that it must be consistent with 
Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC) of the American philosopher 
Alan Gewirth: Act in accord with the generic rights of all agents [9]. In 
Part Two, we provide a detailed illustration of the application of this 
framework by commenting on the CJEU’s controversial reasoning in 
the Brüstle Case [10], and provide a qualified defence of the CJEU’s 
position. The main thrust of our argument is that the CJEU’s judgment 
is substantially correct on the basis of Directive 1998/44/EC. While the 
provisions of the Directive that compel the judgments of the CJEU are 
not necessitated by the PGC, unless it is clearly the case that they are in 
violation of the PGC, then the CJEU had no option but to apply these 
provisions. We contend that the Directive’s provisions are sufficiently 
consistent with the PGC to have left the CJEU no option but to apply 
them. To conclude Part Two, we consider some miscellaneous general 
objections to the Directive as well as some specific objections to the 
CJEU’s reasoning in Brüstle.
In Part Three, we argue that the connection that the concept-
theoretic position forges between IP law, while making immorality 
a barrier to the grant of IP rights, also makes morality a reason for 
granting IP rights.
Part one: Principles for the interpretation of immorality 
exclusions
Human rights as moral rights: Moral obligations and rights, as 
traditionally understood in European philosophy are requirements 
laid down by a categorically binding impartial principle. Being 
requirements of a categorically binding principle, they override all 
other kinds of obligations and rights. Since the principle is impartial, 
and some would argue that this impartiality follows simply from 
the idea of a categorically binding principle [11], all those who have 
moral obligations and rights have them equally to the extent that they 
are capable of discharging or exercising them. Now, as Kant claims, 
if there is a categorical imperative then it must be connected entirely 
a priori with the concept of being an agent, a being who does things 
voluntarily for reasons [12]. From this it follows that moral rights and 
duties (if they exist) are rights and duties that agents must accept that 
they have inalienably, simply by virtue of comprehending the idea 
that they are agents. If there are any moral rights that non-agents 
can have, then they have these inalienably too, because agents who 
have correlative obligations to respect these rights cannot alienate 
themselves from categorically binding duties.Now, according to the 
Preamble of the UDHR, all ‘members of the human family’, all ‘human 
beings’, and all ‘human persons’ are equal in inherent dignity and 
inalienable rights, and Article 1 UDHR proclaims, All human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with 
reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit 
of brotherhood, and Article 2 UDHR states, Everyone is entitled to all 
the rights and freedoms … [of the UDHR] … without distinction of 
any kind.
If all human beings are equal in dignity and rights then whether 
or not the UDHR intends what the second sentence of Article 1 seems 
to imply (that all human beings are agents), it certainly entails that all 
human agents categorically ought to be treated as equal in dignity and 
rights.
Although the UDHR is not itself a legally binding instrument, 
legally binding instruments such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) make it quite clear in their preambles that they 
exist to give effect (at least in part) to the rights of the UDHR. They 
can only do so on the understanding that it is the rights proclaimed by 
the UDHR as conceived by the UDHR that they are giving effect to. It 
follows that human rights in the current human rights system organised 
around the UDHR are, in conception, moral rights. The preamble of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) adds 
to our understanding by declaring that the rights of the UDHR ‘derive 
from the inherent dignity of the human person’. So referred to, human 
dignity is not itself a human right but the property all human beings 
inherently have (by their mere nature as human beings) by virtue of 
which they possess inalienable rights.
The concept of a moral right used here is not unproblematic. 
Indeed, there are some who not only find the claim that there are moral 
rights (and obligations), so conceived, to be rationally unjustifiable, 
but even consider it to be unintelligible [13]. We disagree [14]. But, in 
any event, exactly the same claims can be and have been made about 
human rights. Be that as it may, short of such unintelligibility being 
conclusively demonstrated, it follows that all those legal systems that 
recognize human rights (and all the rights they recognize and duties 
they impose) must be consistent with anything that follows logically 
from their acceptance of the idea that there are human rights under 
the UDHR conception, on pain of repudiating their acceptance of such 
human rights. Equally, it follows that all the actions they permit must 
be consistent with the human rights and duties that are so compliant 
and with the principle that all human beings possess inherent dignity 
as the basis of their human rights.
Immorality exclusions as fundamental principles of EU law: The 
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CJEU has, from very early on in its history, consistently held that the 
fundamental rights and freedoms enshrined in the ECHR (and other 
international human rights instruments, like the ICCPR, to which all 
the EU’s member states are party) form part of the legal order of the 
Community [15]. Indeed, the CJEU has held that at least secondary 
instruments (directives, regulations, etc.) of the EU must comply with 
these fundamental principles on pain of being void, and that the CJEU 
has the power to declare them void on such a basis [16].
Later on, the status of these rights was explicitly acknowledged in 
the EC Treaty and the Treaty of European Union (TEU). For example, 
Article 6 TEU declares that
1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of 
law, principles which are common to the Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by 
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as 
they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, as general principles of Community law. …
Most recently, the Lisbon Treaty has incorporated the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms into the Constitution of 
the EU, and requires the EU to become a formal member of the ECHR 
(which requires the CJEU not only to attend to the principles contained 
in the ECHR, which it has already done, but to view the EU, effectively, 
as a state party to the ECHR). However, since applicable EU law takes 
precedence over the domestic law of the EU states, differences between 
EU law and domestic law cannot stand in exactly the same relation to 
the ECHR as do differences between the domestic laws of parties).
Our submission is that this position is straightforwardly a logical 
and conceptual implication of the concept of a human right as a moral 
right, with the implication that failure to give human rights this status 
in EU law is to repudiate acceptance of human rights per the UDHR 
(and consequently per the ECHR).
Implications: This has a number of specific implications for the 
interpretation of immorality exclusions in EU patent law (and EU IP 
law generally).
Ineradicable status of immorality exclusions: The first implication 
is that there are some requirements that are readable into (indeed, 
would need to be read into) EU patent law, even if Article 6 had never 
been enacted. These requirements are, at the very least, constituted by 
the requirement to act in compliance with human rights in relation to 
the activities that are regulated by Directive 98/44/EC. There is nothing 
special about patent law in this regard. Given the EU’s recognition of 
human rights, all activities regulated by EU law must, by virtue of the 
concept of human rights recognized, comply with human rights, and 
the provisions that regulate them must be equally compliant, which 
they can only be if they prohibit activities within their scope that are 
in violation of human rights. Patent law can only be an exception to 
this if it is not part of the EU legal order [17]. Consequently, only if the 
EU abrogates the idea that there are human rights under the current 
conception of them can this position be altered, and it cannot do this 
while its Member States remain party to the current international 
human rights instruments. So, we can say, with equal validity that there 
are immorality exclusions that must be read into any EU IP laws, even 
though they are not expressly articulated: viz., that these laws must be 
applied consistent with compliance with human rights.
Necessary vs discretionary immorality exclusions: Exclusions 
required to act in conformity with the recognition of human rights 
are necessary exclusions. This fact does not entail that no other 
exclusions may be enacted on moral grounds (i.e., which are to 
be treated as having the same status as an appeal to human rights). 
The only exclusions that may not be so enacted are ones that are 
incompatible with human rights. While the exclusions of Article 6(2) 
(a)-(d) of the Directive are arguably necessary exclusions, it is also 
arguable that they are discretionary. Discretionary exclusions still, 
however, need a justification with reference to human rights as the 
duties that they impose on agents can, in principle, conflict with the 
human rights of agents. Thus, for example, freedom of research may 
be viewed as falling under the human right to freedom of expression, 
and (so viewed) recognition of moral rights of animals (implied by 
Article 6(2)(d)) might impose a restriction on the exercise of the right 
to freedom of expression (though not a denial of the existence of this 
right, which must be viewed as inalienable). To justify this, the reason 
for recognizing a moral right of animals must be to protect human 
rights of agents. Such justification is not impossible. It is arguable that 
lack of certainty that animals are not agents requires agents to act in 
a precautionary manner in relation to animals in order not to violate 
their possible agency rights (i.e., the rights they must be accorded if 
they are in fact, though unknowably, agents) (agency being the basis 
of human agents’ human rights) [18]. If so, the exclusion is arguably 
a necessary one. Alternatively (or additionally) it is arguable, e.g., that 
the contingent sensitivity of some humans to the suffering of animals, 
can entail that not to recognize moral rights of animals is to threaten 
the rights of some human agents [19]. Because the latter argument rests 
on contingencies, it is not necessary and its justification must lie in the 
human rights considerations that must be held to justify democratic 
decision making in a society that recognizes human rights [20].
The proper focus for immorality exclusions: patent grant or 
commercial exploitation of the invention?: A patent confers a right 
on the patent-holder to prevent others from using the invention 
without the consent of the patent-holder. The patent does not confer 
a right on the patent-holder to exploit the invention. Furthermore, 
Directive 98/44/EC regulates the grant of patents for biotechnological 
inventions. It does not regulate research that leads to an invention 
[21] or the exploitation of the invention by the patent-holder, which 
is to say that it neither determines the lawfulness of the activities 
that lead to an invention nor the lawfulness of exploitation of the 
invention by the patent-holder. It does, however, affect the lawfulness 
of exploitation by a third party of the invention, insofar as it provides 
the patent-holder with a cause of action for unconsented exploitation 
of the patented invention. It follows from this that the proper focus for 
immorality exclusions is the morality of granting the monopoly that 
the patent confers. That the Directive does not say so explicitly is beside 
the point. The Directive is to be declared void if it does not prohibit 
conferring this monopoly when to do so would be contrary to human 
rights, for it is this activity that alone falls directly within its scope. 
But there is no serious problem here. True, the explicit focus of the 
Directive makes the morality of commercial exploitation a necessary 
condition for patentability. But what are the conditions under which 
commercial exploitation would be contrary to morality (or ordre 
public)? For the purposes of the Directive, the conceptually compelled 
answer is any circumstances in which the grant of the monopoly right 
would be contrary to morality (or ordre public), including those when 
commercial exploitation of the invention would independently of 
considerations of patenting be contrary to morality (or ordre public). 
This, however, only applies for the purposes of the Directive. It does not 
imply, e.g., that the conditions of morality of commercial exploitation 
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for the purpose of regulating research that might lead to an invention or 
for the purpose of regulating commercial exploitation of the invention 
per se must be regarded as identical to those under which it is moral to 
grant the patent monopoly [22].
Again, should the point really need restating, the proper focus for 
immorality exclusions in any EU IP law is on the morality of granting 
the IP right, rather than anything else.
Broad not narrow immorality exclusions: Because morality refers 
to values thought of as categorical (i.e., part of a categorically binding 
system) [23], there is a sense in which exclusions on the ground of 
immorality are necessarily to be operated broadly. If A categorically 
ought to do X, then A categorically cannot risk not doing X or doing not 
X if it is possible for A to avoid this risk. In a nutshell, this means that if 
there is doubt about the application of, e.g., a human right, then subject 
to it being possible to act in conformity with what protection of the 
right requires, the onus is on those who wish to dispute the application 
of the right to make their case rather than the other way around. Put 
another way, if a case can plausibly be made for considering that an 
immorality exclusion applies, then the exclusion is to apply unless it 
can be shown that the case has, in fact, no plausibility. Now, the general 
practice and policy of patent offices and courts is to apply exclusions 
to patentability narrowly, in the sense of applying the least restrictive 
interpretation when different interpretations present themselves. This 
might be fine when fundamental rights and values are not at stake, but 
it certainly isn’t when they are [24].
Putting extra flesh on the necessary immorality exclusions: As 
linked to human rights provisions, immorality exclusions are rich in 
content. However, there are a number of interpretive lacunae that need 
to be filled for these provisions to be capable of uniform interpretation 
and application to a significant degree. For example, the relevant human 
rights instruments provide no comprehensive principle for prioritizing 
one right over another when the right of one person conflicts with 
the right of another [25]; it is unclear to what extent having a human 
right includes the right-holder having a right to release others from 
the duties they have correlative to the right; it is unclear to what extent 
human rights are positive (rights to assistance to secure the object of 
the right) as well as merely negative (merely rights to non-interference 
with possession of the object of the right); and it is also unclear to what 
extent, if any, duties not to harm animals and unborn humans are to be 
viewed as functions of human rights or as independent of them. In this 
sub-part, we suggest that there is a principle implicit in the recognition 
of human rights that provides at least the outline of an answer to all of 
these questions.
Human rights are correlative to obligations of others in relation to 
the object of the right. If person B has a right to privacy then at least 
some other person A has a duty to protect, or at least not to interfere 
with, B’s privacy. But to say that A has a duty to do something E, is 
to say that there is a reason (indeed, a sufficient reason) why A ought 
to do E. Further, to say that A ought to do E is to imply that A has 
the capacity to choose whether or not to do E. In other words, rules 
prescribing duties can apply only to agents, those who are capable of 
doing something (X) voluntarily in order to achieve purposes or ends 
(E) they have chosen.
Now, if doing X is necessary for A to do E, then A has as much 
reason to do X as to do E. So, if A is unwilling to do X then A ought to 
be unwilling to do E. In other words, A ought to do X or give up trying 
to achieve E. This means that A must, on pain of failing to understand 
what it is to be an agent, accept the Principle of Hypothetical Imperatives 
(PHI); viz:- If doing X (or having Y) is necessary for A to do E, then A 
must do X (or act to secure possession of Y) or give up pursuit of E.
 The implication of this is that any system prescribing duties may 
only make rules that are consistent with the PHI. Any rules that are 
inconsistent with the PHI cannot coherently be accepted by any agent 
(hence cannot be coherently prescribed to an agent).
The PHI, however, is empty of content. But, suppose that there 
are generic conditions of agency (GCAs), conditions the possession of 
which are necessary for A to pursue or achieve E, whatever E is or might 
be (which might also be called categorically instrumental conditions of 
agency). If A is unwilling to defend his possession of the GCAs, then 
A must accept that A cannot pursue or achieve E, regardless of what E 
is or might be. It follows that A must, on pain of failing to understand 
what it is to be an agent, accept, A ought to defend his possession of the 
GCAs, unless he is willing to accept generic damage to his ability to act. 
So, any human agent must on pain of failure to understand what it is 
to be a human agent also accept this principle, which is to say that any 
other agent B must, on pain of failing to understand what it is to be an 
agent, accept B ought to defend her possession of the GCAs, unless she 
is willing to accept generic damage to her ability to act.
While we consider that it follows logically from this that A must, 
similarly accept that A ought to defend B’s possession of the GCAs, 
unless B is willing to accept generic damage to her ability to act, which 
requires A to accept that B has a right to the GCAs, and by implication 
that he has the same right, so that A (and logically also B) must accept 
the PGC, Act in accord with the generic rights of all agents, this is 
highly contentious [26].
In the present context, however, it is not necessary to engage in a 
debate about this. According to Article 1 UDHR, all human beings are 
equal in dignity and rights. It follows that all human agents are equal 
in dignity and rights. But because the GCAs are generic conditions of 
agency they are also generic conditions of the ability to do anything 
required to exercise a right or defend a right, and no grant of an 
inalienable right can be sincere if it precludes the right to defend the 
right. It follows that any grant of human rights to human agents must 
include the grant of human rights to the GCAs. Furthermore, since this 
grant must be consistent with the PHI, it follows that all human rights 
must be interpreted so as to be consistent with the PGC [27].
Now, since the PGC is the universal form of the PHI provided 
with content by the GCAs, it permits agents to release other agents 
from their duties in relation to the generic rights on condition that the 
rights-holder is willing to suffer generic damage to the rights-holder’s 
ability to act. This entitlement is subject only to such release not 
disproportionately damaging possession of the GCAs of other agents 
against their will. This has obvious consequences for cases like that of 
Pretty v the UK [28]. Furthermore, since some GCAs cannot be removed 
without necessarily removing others, but not vice versa (e.g., to remove 
one’s life is to remove all other GCAs, whereas to be provided with false 
information is not to necessarily remove one’s life), the PHI implies 
that the GCAs and, hence the generic rights, are ranked hierarchically 
according to the degree to which their absence has a generic impact 
on the ability to act. In cases of conflict between the right of one agent 
to a GCA with the right of another agent to another GCA, the ‘more 
needful’ GCA takes precedence. In principle, all human rights granted 
to agents must be viewed as rights to agents’ possession of the GCAs in 
line with the PGC, and so no exceptions to these rights can be granted 
except to defend the generic rights of other agents. Since agents need 
assistance to secure their possession of the GCAs when they cannot 
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do so by their own unaided efforts, all generic rights are positive as 
well as negative. However, because agents cannot, in many cases, act 
positively to secure the GCAs of others without disproportionate risk 
to their own possession of the GCAs, protection of positive generic is, 
in practice, the responsibility of collectivities rather than individuals, 
beyond the responsibilities individuals can be assigned to set up the 
necessary collectivities [29].
What then of human non-agents? Well, on the basis of the 
reasoning presented here, human non-agents and other non-agents 
cannot be granted the generic rights, because the generic rights are 
by their nature rights to assistance/non-interference in accordance 
with the right holder’s will, and only agents have a will. But this does 
not mean that agents do not have or may not be charged with duties 
to protect interests of humans and non-humans who do not display 
the capacities of agency. Such duties may be imposed on at least two 
different grounds. The first ground is that a democratic legislative 
decision has imposed such duties, which at least in the case of human 
beings can be made correlative to a human right, provided only that 
this grant does not interfere disproportionately with the generic rights 
of agents. The second ground rests on arguing that because we do 
not know that various living creatures lack the capacities of agency 
just because they are unable to display the capacities of agency, there 
is always a risk that, in acting against interests that living creatures 
have that they would have rights to if they are agents, we violate their 
rights. In order to guard against this, one of us has argued elsewhere 
that we have duties to unborn humans and non-human animals in 
proportion to the degree to which they approach apparent agency [30]. 
Strictly speaking, in this way of thinking, even adult human beings are 
not to be thought of as agents but as apparent agents. However, the 
precautionary reasoning involved categorically requires agents to treat 
apparent agents as agents [31].
Part two: Brüstle
Brüstle as viewed from the concept-theoretic position: In 
Brüstle, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU gave a preliminary ruling 
under Article 267 TFEU on a reference from the Bundesgerichtshof 
(Germany) that, with reference to Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 1998/44/
EC, a ‘human embryo’ refers to any human ovum after fertilization, any 
non-fertilized human ovum into which the cell nucleus from a mature 
human cell has been transplanted, and any non-fertilized human ovum 
whose division and further development have been stimulated by 
parthenogenesis … [but that] it is for the referring court to ascertain, in 
the light of scientific developments, whether a stem cell obtained from 
a human embryo at the blastocyst stage constitutes a human embryo 
[para 38] [32] . The CJEU essentially provides two arguments. The first 
runs as follows.
1. Any provision of EU law that ‘makes no express reference to the 
law of the Member States for the purpose of determining its meaning 
and scope [which is the case with the term ‘human embryo’ in Directive 
1998/44/EC (see para 26)] must normally be given an independent and 
uniform interpretation throughout the European Union’ [para 25], 
which is certainly the case where the express object of the Directive is to 
harmonise rules for the legal protection of biotechnological inventions 
(see recitals, 3, and 5 to 7) [see para 27].
2. Without a uniform definition, inventors would be tempted 
to apply for patents in countries with the least restrictive definition 
(‘narrowest’ in the CJEU’s terminology), and this would ‘adversely 
affect the smooth functioning of the internal market which is the aim 
of the Directive’ [para 28] [33].
3. Therefore, ‘human embryo’ must mean any structure totipotent 
to develop into a born human being [34].
This argument cannot stand by itself. Suppose an embryo were 
defined as only coming into existence at the blastocyst stage. With 
nothing more to add, a just fertilized egg would not be an embryo. 
Consequently, to use it commercially would not be excluded by Article 
6(2)(c). Authors could, therefore, obtain patents on cell stems produced 
by destroying pre-blastocyt humans in countries that define an embryo 
as a blastocyst or post-blastocyst human. Certainly, this would mean 
that patent practice would not be uniform, but it would not mean that 
patent law was not harmonized with respect to the protection required 
by the law. To think otherwise is to presuppose that the aim of the law 
is to render commercial uses of pre-blastocyst embryos unpatentable, 
when this is just what the argument is supposed to show.
However, the CJEU presents a second argument that runs, in 
essence, as follows.
a. The preamble to the Directive provides that ‘use of 
biotechnological material originating from humans must be consistent 
with regard for fundamental rights and, in particular, the dignity of the 
person. Recital 16, in particular, emphasizes that “patent law must be 
applied so as to respect the fundamental principles safeguarding the 
dignity and integrity of the person”’ [para 32].
b. According to Article 5(1) of the Directive, the human body at 
the various stages of its formation and development cannot constitute 
a patentable invention.
c. Recital 38 of the Directive makes it clear that the list of exclusions 
of Article 6(2) is not exhaustive ‘and that all processes the use of which 
offends against human dignity are also excluded from patentability’ 
(referring to Netherlands v Parliament and Council para 71 and 76) [35].
d Hence, the concept of human embryo must be understood in 
a wide sense, so as to exclude ‘any possibility of patentability where 
respect for human dignity could thereby be effected’ (para 34). Hence, 
‘human embryo ‘ must cover any process that begins the process of 
development of a human being’ (para 35) (see paras 35-37), in relation 
to which it is for Member States to decide whether a cell taken from 
a human embryo at the blastocyst stage is, in the light of scientific 
developments, a human embryo (i.e., totipotent) [36].
We submit that this second argument is sound, provided that one 
supposes that a totipotent cell is a stage in the development of the 
human body and not merely a stage towards the development of the 
human body. Although the CJEU does not say so, this supposition is 
justified because recital 16 further specifies that ‘the human body, at 
any stage in its formation or development, including germ cells [our 
emphasis]’ is unpatentable. If even germ cells are to be regarded as a 
stage in the human body’s development then so too must totipotent 
cells. We submit, therefore, that with this being understood, as it must, 
this argument is a correct reading of the Directive, with one proviso. 
That proviso is that an embryo should be defined as a fertilized egg or 
an egg in the process of fertilization as the UK law does [37].In other 
words, the Directive actually requires an even narrower definition of a 
human embryo than the CJEU contends [38].
This position is further supported in International Stem Cell 
Corporation (ISCC) [39]. In the appeal by ISCC over the rejection by 
the UKIPO of a patent application concerning methods of producing 
pluripotent human stem cell lines from parthenogenetically-activate 
oocytes [40], the UK court sought clarification as to the meaning of 
human embryo by referring the case to the CJEU. The CJEU was asked 
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to consider the question: ‘Are unfertilized human ova whose division 
and further development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis, 
and which, in contrast to fertilized ova, contain only pluripotent cells 
and are incapable of developing into human beings included in the 
term “human embryos” in Article 6(2)(c) of Directive 98/44/EC on the 
Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions?’ [41]. The CJEU ruled 
[42] that Article 6(2)(c) Biotech Directive must be interpreted in the 
sense that “an unfertilized human ovum whose division and further 
development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis does not 
constitutes a ‘human embryo’” under the condition that “it does not, 
in itself, have the inherent capacity of developing into a human being” 
(Paragraph 28). The CJEU further clarifies Brüstle, by stating that the 
“the mere fact that an organism commences the process of development 
is not sufficient for it to be regarded as a ‘human embryo’” (Paragraph 
23-29). Therefore, parthenotes should not fall under the exclusion as 
they are considered not capable of developing into a ‘human being’. In 
order to be classified as a human embryo, a non-fertilized human ovum 
must have the inherent capacity of developing into a human being.
The decision is clearly in line with the second CJEU argument in 
Brustle which should be read as the exclusion covering the development 
of the human body and not applying merely a stage towards the 
development of the human body, or, as asked by the High Court, the 
commencement of a process of development, even though the process 
cannot be completed, so that it is incapable of leading to a human being 
[body].
Does the use by the CJEU in ISCC of the term ‘inherent capacity’ 
actually distinguish ISCC from the decision in Brustle? [43] No, all 
that the CJEU is doing is recognizing that it had relied on incorrect 
scientific data concerning parthenotes. We further submit that, with 
the proviso just made, with the second argument supposed, the CJEU’s 
first argument serves to emphasize the importance of the narrowest 
definition of ‘human embryo’ for the purposes of the Directive. The 
CJEU also ruled that uses of human embryos for scientific research are 
additionally excluded from patentability as falling under the industrial 
and commercial uses of embryos. This is because, while ‘the aim of 
scientific research must be distinguished from industrial or commercial 
purposes’, when the use of human embryos for research is the subject 
matter of a patent application, that use is ipso facto for a commercial 
purpose (patenting), and recital 42 of the Directive makes it clear that 
only use for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes which is applied to 
the human embryo and is useful to it is patentable [see paras 43,44]. 
In this the CJEU claimed [see para 45] to be providing an identical 
interpretation to the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO regarding its 
decision of 25 November 2008, G/206, Official Journal EPO, May 2009, 
p.306, paras 25-27 Decision [44]. This reasoning is logically sound.
Finally, the CJEU ruled that an invention is excluded from 
patentability where the technical teaching which is the subject-matter 
of the patent application requires the prior destruction of human 
embryos or their use as base material, whatever the stage at which that 
takes place and even if the description of the technical teaching claimed 
does not refer to the use of human embryos.
The key issue here is whether if a human embryo is used to produce 
something else, and this something else is then used as base material for 
an invention, then use of this base material for a commercial purpose 
(which it is) constitutes use of a human embryo for a commercial 
purpose. The CJEU answers in the affirmative. The reason it gives 
is that if this answer is not given then the intention of the legislator 
would be evaded by skilful drafting of the claim (which was also the 
reasoning of the Enlarged Board in WARF, point 22). Intuitively, this 
must be so, and would be accepted without question in in any area 
other than patent law. If James steals Martha’s car and uses its material 
to make a metal sculpture, which he then sells for profit, can he claim 
that he has not used Martha’s car to make this profit? Why is it different 
here? Surely, it is different only if we suppose that we must interpret 
exclusions narrowly, not even neutrally, let alone broadly. Under a 
broad interpretation, which the concept theoretic position requires 
when conformity with fundamental principles of EU law is stake, the 
matter is clear.
We submit, therefore, that with the provisos made, the CJEU’s 
judgment is substantially sound on the requirements of the Directive. 
This, however, cannot be the end of the story from within the concept-
theoretic position. This is because this position (as does the CJEU’s 
own jurisprudence) requires the Directive itself to be in conformity 
with human rights. Now, the position on the moral status of the human 
embryo that the concept- theoretic position requires is that the human 
embryo is to be accorded only some intrinsic moral status, which 
increases as it develops, and that it is not to be accorded full intrinsic 
moral status until the development of the capacities of agency (beyond 
birth in fact). This does not mean that the human embryo may not 
be assigned a full moral status by democratic legislative decision at an 
earlier stage in its development. But if it is to be assigned such a status 
then the reasons for doing so must be compatible with the full intrinsic 
moral status that human agents must be assigned. In other words, it 
needs to be argued that taking all human rights considerations into 
account, as required by the concept-theoretic position; the Directive is 
not clearly in contravention of human rights. Now, claims are regularly 
made that, e.g., rendering stem cells that are derived by destroying 
totipotent human cells unpatentable are violations of academic 
freedom (the right to freedom of expression of agents), and, indeed, 
violations of the right to life and dignity of agents because this will 
prevent the development of treatments for fatal or debilitating diseases 
and conditions that have at least a strong likelihood of development if 
these stem cells are patentable.
If this is, indeed, clearly the case, and there are no further human 
rights considerations to take into account, then our concept-theoretic 
position requires the CJEU, to have declared the Directive (or at least the 
offending provisions of it) to be void because they are in contravention 
of fundamental principles of EU law. However, as will shortly be seen, 
it is not clearly the case. With this in mind, we submit that the matter 
is, at the very least, not sufficiently clear for the EU to have annulled 
the Directive, and failing being in a position to do so the CJEU had no 
option but to make the rulings it did (subject to the relatively minor 
proviso that we have mentioned).
Objections to Brüstle: The CJEU’s decision was met with outrage 
by many stem cell scientists seeking patents and by many lawyers as 
well. Criticism may be grouped into a number of different categories, 
some of which were raised during the course of the Brüstle and WARF 
cases. For example,
A Claims that the CJEU has acted ultra vires in some way.
B Claims that the CJEU has not acted ultra vires, but has 
misinterpreted the law or interpreted it inconsistently with previous 
decisions.
C Claims that while the CJEU might have interpreted the law 
correctly, the law is at fault and ought to be changed. There are two 
subcategories here
(i) Claims that, while it is fine to have immorality exclusions in 
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patent law, the law enshrines the wrong way of operating them.
(i) Claims that immorality exclusion have, in principle, no place in 
patent law
We will not consider every objection that has been raised, but we 
will comment on these categories as such and what strike us as some of 
the most important examples of them. Throughout, our intention is to 
apply the concept-theoretic position we have outlined to the issues, and 
not to consider objections on their own terms.
A The CJEU acted ultra vires
Objection: It is not the role of the courts to make their own moral 
judgments. That is the role of legislation. But the narrow interpretation 
of ‘human embryo’ involves the court making a moral value judgment, 
which a broad interpretation would not do [45].
Reply: If adopting a narrow interpretation (a definition that implies 
a broad exclusion) involves a court in making a moral value judgment 
then so does adopting a broad interpretation. Adopting a broad 
interpretation would not exclude inventions involving the destruction 
of fertilized eggs, whereas adopting the narrow interpretation does. But 
to permit patenting of the morally controversial use of fertilized eggs 
is just as much to make a moral judgment as to exclude the patenting 
of such use. However, it is, in any event, not true that when the CJEU 
(or other court) interprets legislation it is necessarily making a de 
novo moral value judgment as against judging what moral judgment is 
implicit in the legislation (which is there, implicitly, and unavoidably 
once the issue is morally controversial).
Objection: The specific exclusions of Article 6(2) are with reference 
to Article 6(1), so must be interpreted in line with Article 6(1), which, 
by the jurisprudence of the, requires subsidiarity. So, unless Member 
States share their moral beliefs, definitions of ‘a human embryo’, etc., 
the CJEU may not interpret Article 6(2) so as to impose a uniform 
moral exclusion, definition, etc. [46].
Reply: It simply does not follow from the fact that Article 6(2) is an 
interpretation of Article 6(1) that it cannot impose a uniform definition, 
etc., just because, standing alone, Article 6(1) allows a margin of 
discretion to Member States. An interpreting sub-article can impose a 
uniform definition if it imposes it explicitly (not the case here) or if a 
uniform definition is implicit in what has been legislated elsewhere in 
provisions applicable to the interpretation of the sub-article. The CJEU 
has argued cogently that such a uniform definition is implicit in the 
provisions of the Directive.
Objection: Given accession of the EU to the ECHR, the CJEU will 
be bound by the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, which grants a margin of 
appreciation to Member States on contested issues re application of the 
ECHR (e.g., whether or not the pre-born is a human for the purposes 
of the ECHR). To take this away from the Member States is to act 
unconstitutionally in the new arrangement [47].
Reply: Even supposing that the terms of the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR involve it being bound by the ECtHr’s jurisprudence on human 
rights, this does not follow. The ECtHR does indeed operate a doctrine 
that accords Member States a degree of discretion in the interpretation 
of unclear and hotly contested moral matters between States. But this 
is not a doctrine that States are required to mirror. For them to do 
so would mean that they could not adopt any views on moral matters 
at all in their legislation (which is impossible when the activities raise 
moral issues), for the ECtHR’s doctrine presupposes that States do 
and may adopt different specific moral positions in their law. In short, 
the question of a margin or appreciation can only arise if the member 
States have different positions. And, surely, if the EU as such accedes to 
the ECHR then it must be regarded by the ECtHR as a Member State of 
the Council of Europe. But in being a Member State of the Council of 
Europe it will not be like the Member States of the EU in that it operates 
with, and the EU States have acceded to, the doctrine of the supremacy 
of EU law. Ergo, if it is possible for the EU to accede to the ECHR then 
it follows that the ECtHR cannot treat views that Member States have 
that are in contravention of EU law as laws to which it needs to grant a 
margin of appreciation [48].
B The CJEU has misinterpreted the law
Objection: Patent law requires morality exclusions to be interpreted 
narrowly not broadly [49].
Reply: In response to this objection, the EPO’s Board of Appeal 
in WARF (point 33, T 1374/04) stated that in decision G 1/04 (point 6 
of the reasons) the Enlarged Board of Appeal held that the frequently 
cited principle according to which exclusion clauses from patentability 
laid down in the EPC were to be construed in a restrictive manner, did 
not apply without exception (point 33, T 1374/04). Provisions must 
be considered in the light of their wording, the object and purpose of 
the provision, the interests involved, the consequences of a narrow or 
broad interpretation, respectively, and the aspect of legal certainty. This 
is required by our concept-theoretic position, in relation to which there 
is a presumption that moral exclusions are to be interpreted broadly 
because of the categorical importance of complying with morality.
Objection: Patent law requires terms to be given their ordinary 
scientific meanings [50], which (by medical practice) means that an 
embryo does not exist until 14 days after fertilization [51].
Reply: As we have argued elsewhere [52], the meanings to be 
given to terms in a legal statute depend on the purposes of the statute. 
Thus, for example, the UK Human Embryo and Fertilization Act 1990 
was clearly designed to provide a proportional degree of protection 
to ‘embryos’ [53]. While it defined an ‘embryo’ as ‘a fertilized egg or 
an egg in the process of fertilization’, it was also clear that its concern 
was with structures that could develop into born human beings. The 
Pro-life Alliance, which brought the case, claimed that the Act did not 
cover the latter structures if these were produced by inserting an adult 
somatic cell into a enucleated ovum because this was not a process of 
fertilization (and so the structures were not embryos). However, the 
UK House of Lords ruled that the purpose of the Act was primary 
and on this basis the latter structures were embryos, and that the 
‘definition’ was not a definition, but merely an indication of the stage 
of development at which protection began. We argued that the House 
of Lords would have done better to claim that, for the purposes of the 
Act, the provisions constituted a definition but that the process was, 
in legal fact, a process of fertilization, and that the enucleated ovum 
and somatic nucleus were, in the context of being used to produce an 
organism capable of development into a born human being, gametes. 
The ruling of the CJEU, in effect, follows just such a path.
There is nothing in the least odd about this. The now replaced UK 
Act did not, and the Directive does not, exist to regulate the use of 
terms for scientific or medical purposes, and their definitions have no 
bearing on or implications for the latter. Their definitions must serve 
the normative purposes of their legislation and nothing else.
Objection: The CJEU in Brüstle falsely claims the authority of Italy 
and The Netherlands [54].According to Italy and The Netherlands, 
under Article 6(1) Member States have discretion, while under Article 
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6(2) they do not. So, since embryonic stem cells are not embryos, 
they do not fall under Article 6(2), merely under Article 6(1), and so 
Member States must have discretion to decide what counts as a human 
embryo [55].
Reply: Article 6(1) and Article 6(2) cannot be separated in this 
way. Article 6(2) is a list of what under Article 6(1) is excluded, and it 
is clearly stated that what is excluded under Article 6(2) (i.e., without 
a margin of appreciation for Member States) is not exhaustive. So, it 
must be possible for some exclusions to exist under Article 6(1) (i.e., 
ones not specifically listed under Article 6(2)) over which there is no 
margin of appreciation. These are those that are excluded because 
of violation of fundamental principles of EU law or by explicit EU 
legislation elsewhere, with those over which there is a margin of 
appreciation being those that are excluded for reasons of domestically 
restricted moral objection. When Italy and The Netherlands states that 
there is discretion under Article 6(1) this cannot be taken to mean that 
there is a universal margin of appreciation under Article 6(1). It must 
be taken to mean that, absent exclusion under Article 6(2), Member 
States are presented with having to make the decision (it not having 
been made for them already) about its status vis a vis Article 6(1). In 
doing so, they must reason according to the criteria laid down by the 
Directive, which are, broadly, fundamental principles and/or existing 
co-ordinate EU legislation vs domestic principles. If the exclusion falls 
under fundamental principles or co-ordinate EU legislation, there is 
no margin of appreciation (i.e., the discretion that Member States have 
cannot be exercised to defend a margin of appreciation). If it falls under 
the latter then there is. What the CJEU argues in Brüstle, is consistent 
with this: its claim is that the exclusion of embryonic stem cells is due 
to what is legislated, inter alia, in Article 5 of the Directive.
C The law ought to be changed
(i) The wrong morality test is enshrined [56].
Reply: We will not go into what the test is that objectors think 
should be employed. Rather we will concentrate on the test that the 
concept-theoretic position requires.
First of all, it holds that it is not rationally required to grant the 
human embryo full moral status. Under precaution, the human 
embryo is to be granted some status, which is to increase as the embryo 
develops. Precisely how much status, however, is not something that 
it holds can be determined directly. Consequently, only in limited 
circumstances does it dictate directly and unequivocally how conflicts 
between the interests of the embryo and (apparent) [57] agents are to 
be dealt with. These are circumstances in which there is a clear one 
variable conflict between identifiable interests of the embryo (e.g., its 
life) and the corresponding right of an agent. In this example, the right 
of a mother to life will override the interest in life of her unborn embryo 
in utero when the continued existence of the embryo threatens the life 
of the mother simply because the mother is more probably an agent 
than the embryo. But things are different if we must weigh the life of the 
embryo against a lesser right of the mother. When these complexities 
are introduced, the concept-theoretic position requires decisions to 
be made by delegating decisions to the democratic legislature (which 
might delegate them to courts or other bodies). Such delegation is not 
unlimited, however. It is subject to constraints that derive directly from 
the PGC.
The issue with regard to patenting is essentially this. If granting 
patents for stem cell research on embryos (even where the destruction 
of embryos is involved) is necessary for lifesaving treatment to be 
developed then the concept-theoretic position will, with nothing more 
to be said, allow such patenting. The problem is that it is far from 
clear that granting patents on products and procedure that involve 
the destruction of embryos is necessary for lifesaving treatments to be 
developed. This is not only because of the possible use of stem cells 
derived from adult cells, but because of the use of pluripotent cells taken 
from blastocysts that do not involve the destruction of embryos. To this 
must be added the fact that there are other means by which researchers 
can protect their investments in stem cell research [58], and, indeed, 
that prohibiting patents on products and processes involving the 
destruction of embryos might even be an incentive to research [59].
According to the concept-theoretic position, it is necessary, 
in principle, to allow for the weighing of the rights-corresponding 
interests of the embryo against the rights of agents on the premise that 
the embryo has only a minimal moral status to begin with that develops 
as it develops to agency, and if the Directive were to disproportionately 
to endanger the rights of agents then the offending provisions should 
be declared void. It is, however, wholly unclear that this is the case and 
we do not see how the CJEU could have declared this to be the case.
But might it not be said that the problem is that the Directive 
does not recognize that the human embryo is only to be granted a 
proportionate status, and so does not allow for any circumstance in 
which a patent could be allowed on processes or products developed by 
destroying an embryo?
Now, if it were clear that the Directive was legislated on the 
presumption that the embryo has full moral status, this would create 
a problem. But this is not clear. So, provided that the fact that the 
legislation does not permit circumstances in which commercial uses 
of embryos may be patented is compatible with the embryo having 
only a proportionate status, then the problem evaporates. However, 
for attribution of a proportionate moral status of the human embryo 
to conflict with the provisions of the Directive it is necessary that the 
satisfaction of human rights of born humans requires research to be 
done that involves the destruction of totipotent cells and that such 
research will not be done unless patents are granted for the products 
and processes of such research. But the first condition is not satisfied 
because stem cells developed from single merely pluripotent human 
blastocyst cells (which do not require the destruction of human 
embryos) are as efficacious as those produced from totipotent cells. 
And, even if the first condition were satisfied, the second condition 
is not satisfied because there are ways in which investment can be 
protected other than by the grant of patents [60], and (as we have 
already said) it is even arguable that not granting patents is likely to 
stimulate rather than inhibit research [61]. Consequently there is no 
basis for holding that the Directive relies on a position incompatible 
with our concept-theoretic position.
(ii) Immorality exclusions have no place in patent law
Objection: Law and morality are conceptually distinct [62].
Reply: That law and morality are conceptually distinct is a contested 
thesis about the sources of obligation in law. But even if it is true (which 
one of us, at least, does not accept) [63], this thesis does not entail that 
law may not or cannot incorporate morality clauses. The thrust of the 
legal positivism that the objection appeals to is that the validity of a 
law depends on nothing other than its source in positive enactment. 
But that positive enactment, as the source of legal authority, can and 
may lay down moral rules for the validity of laws and actions, because 
the authority of morality so laid down is a function of the fact of the 
enactment. In this perspective, positive EU law can make conformity 
with human rights (as we have argued it does) a condition of legality. 
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Legal Positivism differs from the opposed legal idealist (or natural law) 
perspective in that the latter requires positive law to lay down such 
requirements in order to be valid. If human rights can be justified as 
categorically binding requirements on action, then it follows that no 
rules can be binding that are not in conformity with human rights. But 
we have not assumed or argued that this is the case here. All we have 
assumed is that when the law enshrines human rights then it is bound 
to give these a fundamental status on pain of abrogating its acceptance 
of human rights. That is both possible and coherent.
Objection: Moral considerations render the law uncertain [64].
Reply: Moral considerations are often complex and moral criteria 
are disputed. This is not something that is unique to morality, however. 
Many legal cases are deeply contested and disputed without involving 
moral clauses, and not merely because of their factual complexity. A key 
to legal certainty is clear definitions and rules of interpretation. These 
can be absent when moral clauses are not involved. But clear rules 
and definitions are no more (or less) problematic when immorality 
exclusion clauses are not involved than when they are.
Objection: Patent examiners/judges/lawyers have no competence 
to deal with moral questions.
Reply: The reply to this can be very short. Any examiner/judge/
lawyer operating within the patent system who claims this should 
be dismissed (or should be regarded as having resigned). If the law 
requires moral questions to be assessed then those required by law to 
assess them must obtain and gain the necessary expertise. But, as we 
have indicated, previously, judges and others considering morality 
provisions in the law are interpreting it not making de novo judgments.
Objection: Moral concerns about research activities and their 
consequences are not the concern of patent law and should be dealt 
with entirely by the law outside of patent law.
Reply: It is not the concern of patent law to regulate anything 
other than the grant of a patent. The fact that the law requires it to 
consider the morality of commercial exploitation of an invention in 
doing so, alters this not one jot. Requiring commercial exploitation not 
to be contrary to morality does not render commercial exploitation 
unlawful. Of course, denying patents on particular grounds might 
make it unprofitable for would be inventors to engage in those 
activities. So, such a prohibition might assist with the aim of regulation 
of these activities. If so, those wishing to prohibit certain activities 
would be wise to render the products of these activities or the activities 
themselves unpatentable. But in no way does this imply that patent law 
is to replace direct regulation of these activities.
Part three: Morality as a basis for IP rights: The prevailing attitude 
of those seeking IP rights (particularly patents) is to view attention to 
moral considerations in the law as an obstacle to the grant of these 
rights. This is despite the fact that IP rights are traditionally referred 
to as moral rights. To be sure, this reference does not carry the same 
meaning (categorically binding impartial requirements) that out use of 
the term primarily carries in this paper. Rather it refers to the idea that 
IP rights are to be granted as owed to the inventiveness of the author. 
However, the two ideas are not wholly disconnected.
It is not our intention, in this concluding Part, to provide and 
justify a full-scale view on how our concept-theoretic position justifies 
IP rights in terms of human rights. We will, however, sketch such an 
account, in full appreciation that what we will say is highly contentious 
and requires a great deal of elaboration and fuller justification.
So how might our concept-theoretic position justify IP rights in 
terms of human rights? One of us has argued elsewhere [65] that a 
property right is best understood as a ‘rule-preclusionary right’, which 
is to say that what characterizes a claim to a right as a property right 
is not centrally the claim to have some specific bundle of powers to 
control an object, though the power to use and to prevent others’ use of 
the object of the right is essentially involved. Rather, it is the claim that if 
X is A’s property then A does not, as a presumptive rule, need to justify 
A’s power to use and to prevent others from using the object of the 
right even when A does not need to use it and others do. Premised on 
this, it was argued that there is only one object that A clearly has a right 
to in these terms. This is A’s body as an instantiation or vehicle of A’s 
person. The reason for this is that A’s body is so related to A’s existence 
as a person that for A to have to justify A’s control over A’s body on a 
case by case basis before the power’s A claims over it can be exercised 
would disproportionately threaten A’s very existence. This does not 
mean that A’s claim can never be overridden. The central point is that 
the default position must always be that, failing the case being made by 
others for the moral rights of others conflicting with and overriding (in 
PGC terms) A’s right to control A’s body, A must be granted, without 
having to justify this, the essential powers of control over A’s body. So 
(and contrary to much received bioethical wisdom) unless one can own 
one’s body, one cannot own anything. In these terms, a claim to have 
some object as one’s property that is not physically part of one’s body, 
is the claim that it is normatively to be regarded as part of one’s body 
(i.e., as having the same normative significance it would have if it were 
physically part of one’s body).
Now, things that A has created, whether they be works of 
art, or inventions, are naturally viewed as expressions, indeed, as 
instantiations of A‘s person; the further thought being that, as such, to 
use such instantiations, especially for another’s personal profit, without 
A’s consent is to use A’s person to A’s (at least putative) detriment. 
As such, rights to control such works have the hallmarks that would 
enable them to be assimilated under what in German jurisprudence 
are thought of as personality rights (to be distinguished from, though 
related to, such rights in IP law) [66]. Here it is to be observed that the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been in the direction of construing 
the right to private life under Article 8 ECHR as just such a right [67]. 
Hence, our suggestion is that IP rights be viewed as falling under 
the Article 8 right to private life, which in turn is to be analyzed as a 
property right in rule preclusionary terms. The significance of such an 
account is that if IP rights are grounded in human rights (moral rights 
in our primary sense) (specifically the right to private life) then there 
is a ++ balance to be drawn between the PGC’s protection of an IP 
right and PGC driven exclusions to the grant of the right in particular 
circumstances. If the reason for granting the right is exclusively to 
protect investment of the would-be IP right holder, without this being 
justified by human rights considerations, then any conflict with PGC 
driven reasons not to grant the right must automatically preclude the 
right. In these terms, moral considerations in IP law are as much friend 
as foe to authors’ IP rights.
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